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ABSTRACT
Despite the large amount of empirical research on monetary policy rules, there is surprisingly little
consensus on the nature or even the existence of changes in the conduct of U.S. monetary policy.
Three issues appear central to this disagreement: 1) the specific type of changes in the policy
coefficients, 2) the treatment of heteroskedasticity, and 3) the real-time nature of the data used. This
paper addresses these issues in the context of forward-looking Taylor rules with drifting coefficients.
The estimation is based on real-time data and accounts for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the
policy shock. The findings suggest important but gradual changes in the rule coefficients, not
adequately captured by the usual split-sample estimation. In contrast to Orphanides (2002, 2003),
I find that the Fed's response to the real-time forecast of inflation was weak in the second half of the
1970's, perhaps not satisfying Taylor's principle as suggested by Clarida, Galìì and Gertler (2000).
However, the response to inflation was strong before 1973 and gradually regained strength from the
early 1980's onward. Moreover, as in Orphanides (2003), the Fed's response to real activity fell
substantially and lastingly during the 1970's.
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Since the end of the great inﬂation of the 1970’s, the U.S. has experienced only mild inﬂation and a
considerable reduction in the volatility of real activity.1 An important question is what, ultimately,
brought about these improved economic outcomes.
One possible explanation is that the Federal Reserve changed its behavior in an important way.
From a narrative perspective, this seems fairly uncontroversial, although the reasons for the changes
m i g h tb em o r es o . 2 The monetarist inﬂuence of the late 1970’s, culminating in the “experiment” of
1979-1982 under chairman Volcker, is often cited as an example. It has also been argued that the
composition of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and other political pressures might
have fundamentally altered monetary policy decisions over time. Further, the Fed might have
learned from past experiences, changed its views about the economy and, accordingly, modiﬁed its
conduct of monetary policy.3
However, despite the large amount of empirical research on monetary policy rules, there is
surprisingly little consensus on the nature or even the existence of these hypothesized changes.
Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000) provide empirical evidence of important changes in the U.S.
conduct of monetary policy over the last forty years. In particular they ﬁnd that while monetary
policy accommodated inﬂation in the 1970’s, this drastically and suddenly changed with the ap-
1See among others, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Stock and Watson (2002).
2See Romer and Romer (2002) and Sargent (2002)’s discussion.
3Romer and Romer (1989) argue that the Fed’s concerns for inﬂation and unemployment may have changed
signiﬁcantly with the arrival of Volcker. The importance of changing political pressures and ideologies on the conduct
of monetary policy has been advanced by Froyen (1974), Potts and Luckett (1978) and Blinder (1986) among others.
Finally, DeLong (1997), Taylor (1998), Sargent (1999) and Romer and Romer (2002) suggest learning or changing
beliefs stories — not necessarily continuous according to the latter — that could explain an evolution in the Fed’s
response to the economy.
3pointment of Volcker in 1979. They emphasize that the pre-Volcker conduct of monetary policy did
not satisfy the so-called Taylor principle, so that a given increase in inﬂation was typically associ-
ated with a smaller increase in the nominal interest rate, thus resulting in a lower real interest rate.
They argue that such behavior on the part of the Fed did not rule out non-fundamental ﬂuctuations.
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) reach similar conclusions while formally testing for indeterminacy in
the context of an estimated general equilibrium model.
This evidence has been challenged along three dimensions. First, Cogley and Sargent (2001)
argue that the Fed’s evolving views about the economy might have been more gradual. Cogley and
Sargent (2001) specify a reduced form vector autoregression (VAR) with drifting coeﬃcients which
produces results, they argue, broadly consistent with those of Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2002),
although the time variation is not clearly of a discrete nature. Second, Sims (2001) and Stock
(2001) argue that Cogley and Sargent’s (2001) conclusion might be contaminated by the presence
of heteroskedasticity. This claim is supported in part by the evidence of Sims (1999) and Sims
and Zha (2004), who ﬁnd that most of the observed changes between the pre- and post-Volcker
periods can be attributed to changes in the variance of the shocks. Yet, Cogley and Sargent (2005),
extending their earlier model to allow for heteroskedasticity in the reduced form VAR shocks, still
ﬁnd important changes in the implied policy rule parameters. Finally, the evidence of changes in
the conduct of monetary policy has also been challenged on the ground that it does not properly
account for real-time issues, both in terms if the vintage of data used and the misperceptions
about potential output. For instance, Orphanides (2001) argues that estimating monetary policy
rules on ex post data, which were not available to policymakers in real-time, can lead to a very
distorted picture of the historical conduct of monetary policy. Orphanides (2002) concludes that
when the Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000) rule is estimated using real-time data on inﬂation and
4unemployment the conduct of monetary policy in the 1970’s is not greatly diﬀerent from the one
thereafter. Orphanides (2003) reaches a similar conclusion, using real-time estimates of the output
g a p ,e x c e p tt h a th eﬁnds evidence of a reduction in the response to real activity.
The conclusion on whether or not systematic monetary policy changed thus appears to be par-
ticularly sensitive to: 1) the way the time variation of the coeﬃcients is modeled, 2) the treatment
of heteroskedasticity and 3) whether or not the real-time nature of the data is taken into account.
The goal of this paper is to contribute to this debate by considering an empirical framework
that accounts simultaneously for these three potential issues. Given that there is considerable
uncertainty about the true nature of the changes in monetary policy, I entertain the possibility
that the conﬂicting evidence reported in the literature might be stemming from the use of empirical
framework not suﬃciently ﬂexible to allow for a rich evolution of monetary policy. I consider a
forward-looking Taylor rule with time-varying coeﬃcients. Following the pioneering work of Cooley
and Prescott (1978), the time variation is modeled as driftless random walks, and is estimated
using the median-unbiased estimator proposed by Stock and Watson (1998). I argue that this is an
appealing and ﬂexible way of uncovering changes in policy. Importantly, the estimation recognizes
explicitly the presence of heteroskedasticity, allowing for changes in the variance of the policy shock.
Finally, given the possibility that the existing evidence suggesting important changes in monetary
policy might be due to an inappropriate account of the real-time nature of monetary policy, I
follow Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2003) and model the forward-looking behavior directly using the
forecasts produced in real time by the staﬀ economists at the Board of Governors, published in the
Greenbook.
The ﬁndings suggest substantial changes in the Fed’s response to inﬂation and real activity,
not properly accounted for by the typical split-sample approach. In contrast to what is typically
5assumed in the literature, a single regime does not appear to properly characterize the pre-Volcker
conduct of monetary policy. The response to inﬂation was strong until around 1974, but then
fell dramatically in the second half of the 1970’s, perhaps not satisfying the Taylor principle. In
parallel, the response to real activity weakened continuously throughout the 1970’s. Moreover,
the transition under Volcker appears to have happened gradually, with the most important changes
occurring between 1980 and 1982 and not in 1979, as is often assumed. From the mid-1980’s onward,
monetary policy consistently responded strongly to inﬂation and weakly to real-activity. More than
the real-time data issue, the failure to properly account for this rich evolution of monetary policy
appears to be the reason why Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000) and Orphanides (2002, 2003) ﬁnd
conﬂicting results.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the speciﬁcation of the forward-looking
Taylor rule and describes the Greenbook forecasts. Section 3 speciﬁes a time-varying parameter
model and Section 4 describes the estimation. In section Section 5, I present the results and
show their robustness to an alternative treatment of heteroskedasticity, various speciﬁcations of
the forecasting horizons and diﬀerent measures of real activity. In particular, to make sure that
the main conclusions are not due to unknown particular features of the conditioning scenarios
embedded in the Greenbook forecasts, I report results based on the current period real-time value
of inﬂation and real activity. Section 6 concludes.
62 A forward-looking Taylor rule
A popular structural characterization of the monetary policy conduct is the forward-looking version
of Taylor’s (1993) rule:
Rt = αt + βtπt+hπ|t + γtxt+hx|t + ρt(L)Rt−1 + εt (1)
= Φ0
tZt + εt
where Rt is a short-term interest rate and πt+hπ|t and xt+hx|t are the Fed’s expectations of inﬂation
and some proxy of the output gap, respectively at horizons hπ and hx.N o t e t h a t a l l c o e ﬃcients
have a t subscript to emphasize that they are potentially time-varying. The vector Φt denotes the
collection of these parameters and Zt the corresponding regressors.
This speciﬁcation has been widely used both as a successful empirical description of monetary
policy and as a normative prescription.4 Taylor (1993) argues that a constrained version of this
rule — with no lags of Rt, hπ = hx =0 , the contemporaneous value of linearly detrended GDP,
and time invariant parameters — ﬁts the Greenspan’s conduct of monetary policy between 1987 and
1992 impressively well. This led to numerous applications of the Taylor rule on U.S. data, and for
other countries as well.5
Various approaches have been employed to estimate such a rule. One is to explicitly model and
estimate the expectation process, as in Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000). They assume that the Fed
has rational expectations, which implies a set of moment conditions that can be used in a GMM
framework.6 Their split-sample estimates suggests important changes in the conduct of monetary
4See for instance the papers collected in Taylor (1999) and the references therein.
5For instance, Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1998) show the empirical success of (1) for Germany, Japan, UK, France
and Italy, over the post-1980 period.
6A much earlier reference on the direct estimation of the Fed’s expectations and of their inclusion, through IV
estimation, in the policy rule, is Abrams, Froyen and Waud (1980).
7policy. Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2003) argues, however, that this evidence, based on ex post data,
does not properly account for the information that was actually available to policy makers at
the time decisions were made. If the data available to policy makers and their perception about
the output gap were, in real time, considerably diﬀerent from what we now know, the historical
characterization of monetary policy based on ex post data could be distorted. In fact, using real-
time forecasts of inﬂation and real activity to estimate equation (1), Orphanides (2002, 2003) ﬁnds
that the conduct of monetary policy in the 1970’s is not greatly diﬀerent from the one thereafter,
thus contradicting the conclusion reached by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000).
Since this diﬀerence in result has been attributed in part to the treatment of the real-time nature
of monetary policy, it is important to acknowledge this issue in the empirical framework. I thus
follow Orphanides and use, as a proxy for the Fed’s expectations, the forecasts computed by the
staﬀ of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors before each FOMC meeting and published in what is
known as the Greenbook.7 As Orphanides argues, one of their key appeal is that they do not assume
knowledge of the subsequent revisions of these data, embedded in the ex post data typically used.
Moreover, they might contain more information than small-scale empirical models, such as VARs.
As illustrated by Romer and Romer (2000), the Fed might have an informational advantage over the
private sector that is reﬂected in the Greenbook. Second, as argued by Bernanke and Boivin (2003),
a large set of conditioning information might be required to properly model monetary policy. In
that respect, the Greenbook forecasts presumably include information from a wide range of sources,
including the forecasters’ “judgement”, which is not otherwise directly measured.
7The Greenbook forecasts have been used originally in the estimation of policy rules by McNees (1986, 1992) and
more recently by Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2003) and Romer and Romer (2003). Romer and Romer (2000) document
their superior historical performance, relative to private sector forecasts, in forecasting inﬂation. For a discussion of
the properties of the Greenbook forecasting errors, see Romer and Romer (2000, 2002) and Orphanides (2002).
8Implicit in the estimation of (1) by OLS, as in Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2003), or with time-
varying parameters, as in the present paper, is the assumption that the Greenbook forecasts are
contemporaneously uncorrelated with the policy shock, εt. In particular, this requires that for any
given period, the forecasts are not based on knowledge of the actual deviation of the policy setting
from the one prescribed by the rule itself, i.e. the policy surprise. While some casual arguments
could be made to support this assumption8, its validity can unfortunately not be checked directly, as
there is no oﬃcial detailed documentation of the conditioning scenarios underlying the Greenbook
forecasts.9 One potential limitation of the direct estimation of Taylor rules using Greenbook data
is thus that the endogeneity could introduce some bias in the policy parameter estimates. If this
is the case, one should be careful before concluding that the inﬂation response, say, took a speciﬁc
range of values at some point in the sample. However, two important observations should be made
at this stage. First, as long as this endogeneity was systematic throughout the sample period, it
could not be responsible for a low frequency evolution of the policy parameters that our empirical
8For instance, that the forecasts are produced by the Staﬀ, before the FOMC meeting, independently of the actual
decision subsequently taken.
9Reifschneider, Stockton and Wilcox (1997) provide some information on how these forecasts were constructed in
last ten years at least. First, the forecasts are based on a set of conditioning assumptions, in particular about the
expected path of monetary policy. Typically, this assumption is that the “nominal federal funds rate will remain
unchanged over the next sixth to eight quarters”. By construction, they thus do not provide the best forecasting
performance possible, but rather a benchmark summarizing the momentum already in place in the economy. This
“neutral” assumption about the future path of monetary policy reﬂects the institutional division between the Board
staﬀ and the FOMC, and in particular the fact that the Staﬀ aims to avoid being construed as making policy
recommendations. This could suggest that for most of that period, the forecasts were not conditioned on the policy
surprise. The second feature is that while econometric models, like the large-scale FRB/US model, are used in
constructing the forecasts, there is a large “judgmental” component. As a result, the forecasts cannot be mechanically
reproduced from any particular forecasting model.
9framework is designed to uncover. Second, if inﬂation and real-activity res p o n do n l yw i t hal a gt o
changes in policy, as is often assumed in monetary VAR analysis using quarterly data10,t h er e a l -
time current quarter values of inﬂation and real activity, i.e. hπ = hx =0 , should not be aﬀected
contemporaneously by εt, and are thus not subject to the potential endogeneity problem. Based on
this observation, the strategy adopted in this paper is to document the evolution of monetary policy
using diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the forecasting horizons in the Taylor rule. Since, as I show below,
the characterization of the evolution of monetary policy is essentially the same for all horizons, and
in particular for the speciﬁcation using the forecasts for the current quarter, this suggests that the
evidence of changes in monetary policy, the main conclusion of this paper, is not an artifact of this
potential endogeneity issue.
3 Modeling the time variation
How did the conduct of monetary policy change and by how much? Answering these questions
requires modeling the time variation in the parameters. In doing so, it is important to keep in
mind that the conduct of monetary policy might have evolved in various ways. In particular,
there is no guarantee that the implied changes in the parameters were discrete. For instance, time
variation stemming from an evolving view of the Fed on the economy would suggest gradual and
continuous drifts in the policy parameters. Even the Volcker “experiment”, which is most often
thought as a one-time discrete change in policy, might have implied an adjustment process taking
place over a few years. Furthermore, not all the parameters are necessarily changing exactly at the
same date. If this is the case, split-sample estimates could be misleading. Unfortunately, standard
10See among others, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2000).
10stability tests, such as the Quandt (1960) likelihood ratio test, cannot discriminate between the
diﬀerent forms of instability: they all have power against various alternatives and more than one
type of change might be present in the policy reaction function.
It thus seems useful to explore an alternative to the often assumed discrete break model. The
time-varying parameter (TVP) model considered in this paper assumes instead that the policy
parameters follow driftless random walks:
Φt = Φt−1 + ωt
where E[ωt]=0 . This is the model proposed by Cooley and Prescott (1976), partly as a way to
empirically account for the Lucas (1976) critique on the inappropriateness of stable econometric
models for policy evaluations. It has been widely used in forecasting applications,11 and Cogley and
Sargent (2001, 2003) use this speciﬁcation for the parameters of their reduced-form VAR model.
Given the various factors that might have inﬂuenced monetary policy, the main appeal of the
TVP model is its ability to uncover changes of a general, and potentially permanent, nature,
for each parameter separately. Of course, if the true change is a single discrete jump, and is
simultaneous for all parameters, the TVP model would be mis-speciﬁed. But this is arguably a
very speciﬁc case and even then, the TVP model can provide, as seems to be the case in the
empirical application below, a useful approximation. Intuitively, the TVP estimator of Φt applies
weights, decreasing the importance of observations farther away from t, whereas OLS gives equal
weights to all observation.12 As such, the TVP estimate would produce a smooth estimate of the
discrete change, with the parameters starting to change before the actual break date. It is thus
possible to determine whether the uncovered changes are consistent at all with a discrete break
11See Stock and Watson (1996).
12Note that this down-weighting scheme implies, for the sample size considered in this paper, that observations at
the beginning and at the end of the samples have very little inﬂuence on the mid-sample estimates of the parameters.
11model.
Moreover, as soon as there is more than one discrete change, or diﬀerent dates for diﬀerent
parameters, it might in fact be desirable to approximate the changes with the TVP model rather
than estimating a multiple break model. One reason is that the multiple break model requires the
estimation of many parameters, an estimate on each side of the breaks, for each coeﬃcient. Another
reason is that it requires an estimate of the break dates, which in macroeconomic applications
often involves considerable uncertainty.13 Consequently, although such an estimation approach is
feasible in principle, it tends to produce unsatisfactory results when the number of breaks is large
relative to the sample size or the break dates are too close to each other. The TVP speciﬁcation
can approximate the multiple discrete changes in a parsimonious way, the number of estimated
parameters being independent of the number of break dates.
The TVP model thus appears to be a ﬂexible, parsimonious and tractable way of uncovering
the nature of the time variation.
4 Heteroskedasticity-robust TVP estimation
Provided with an estimate of the variance of ωt, the time series of the parameters, {Φt},c a nb e
obtained using the Kalman ﬁlter or equivalently, by generalized least squares. All the parameters of
the model, including the variance of ωt, can be estimated jointly by maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE), using the Kalman ﬁlter to construct the likelihood function from its forecasts error decom-
position representation. But if the variance of ωt is small, its maximum likelihood estimate tends
to be biased toward 0.14 This is potentially an important problem in the context of macroeconomic
relations because, even though the time variation in the parameters is found to be statistically
13See for instance Stock and Watson (2002). This is also a feature of the results presented below.
14That is, the MLE has a (large) point mass at 0. See Stock and Watson (1998) for a discussion of this point.
12signiﬁcant, and the changes over the sample are economically important, they might still imply a
small period to period variation in the parameters. As we show below, this is indeed the case for
the current application.
This paper thus considers an alternative way of estimating the variance of ωt using an estimation
approach proposed by Stock and Watson (1998). Their strategy is explicitly designed to account
for the deﬁciency of the MLE when the parameters’ variance is small. Another important appeal
is that it is computationally easy to implement.
The general idea of the estimation method is to exploit the fact that the distribution of a
stability test, under the alternative of a TVP model, depends on the variance of the parameters.
Hence, if all other parameters are known or consistently estimable, an estimate of the variance of
these parameters can be inferred from a realization of a given stability test.
More speciﬁcally, we can rewrite the random walk speciﬁcation for the time-varying policy
parameters as:
∆Φt = ωt = τυt
where υt and the policy shock, εt, are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated mean 0 random distur-
bances.15 The scalar τ governs the size of the variance of the parameters. To permit approximations
based on non-degenerate asymptotic distributions, the case where it is small is formalized by making
τ l o c a lt o0 ,t h a ti s :
τ = λ/T.
In order to understand this parameterization, one needs to make the distinction between the small
15Stock and Watson (1998) and Boivin and Watson (1999) discuss the set of assumptions underlying the asymptotic
theory of this estimator.
13sample quantity τ, which we wish to estimate, and the asymptotic device that is used to estimate
it. In fact, while asymptotically this parameterization implies that the variance of the parameters
vanishes, for any given sample T and λ 6=0 , τ is a ﬁxed non-zero quantity. Besides, since the
estimation is based on the asymptotic distribution of a test statistic, this parameterization gives a
meaning to τ being “small” asymptotically. More speciﬁcally, as it is the case when computing the
local power of a test, the standard deviation of the parameters is assumed to shrink at the same
rate as the sample size, which is suﬃciently slowly to make the asymptotic distributions of the test
depend on λ.
From Theorem 1 of Stock and Watson (1998), the asymptotic distribution of the Quandt (1960)
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t] and Wi are Brownian motions.17 Given
D,a ne s t i m a t eo fλ can be inferred from the realization of QLRT. Stock and Watson (1998) use
D = I in their application, since it simpliﬁes the computation of the estimator and makes the time
variation comparable across parameters, if the variables are measured in standard deviation units.
Since there is no clear alternative, I follow this approach.
16This is a standard approach to test the null of stability against the alternative of a structural break occurring at
an unknown date. Andrews (1993) derived the asymptotic null distribution of this test.
17Stock and Watson (1998) assume that Zt does not contain lagged dependent variables. However, the results of
Li (2004) imply that the derivations of Stock and Waston (1998) are also valid when Zt contains lagged dependent
variables.
14In order to make sure that the time variation found in the policy rule is not contaminated by
the presence of heteroskedasticity in the policy shocks, an heteroskedasticity-robust version of this
estimation is implemented. The estimation of var(∆Φt) proceeds as follows:
1. An estimate of λ is readily obtained by inverting the heteroskedasticity-robust version of the
QLRT test, which can be performed simply by using a lookup table, such as the one in Stock
and Watson (1998);
2. Σzz is estimated with T−1 PT
t=1 ZtZ0
t and, based on the Stock and Watson (1998) results, un-
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is obtained in the same way as
in the standard MLE approach, using the Kalman smoother. This eﬀectively means that in the
estimation of ˆ Φt, observations away from t, on both sides, are down-weighted. In fact, the larger
the estimated variance of the parameters, the more rapidly these weights are declining as we get
away from t.
Importantly, and again to make sure that the results are not contaminated by the presence of
heteroskedasticity in the policy rule, the implementation of the Kalman ﬁlter allows for changes
in the variance of the policy shock. The variance of the policy shock is estimated separately over
diﬀerent regimes, from the OLS residuals.18
18Note that, given the local-to-zero time variation assumed in this paper, this way of estimating the variance of
t h es h o c k si se n t i r e l yc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h eT V Ps p e c i ﬁcation, asymptotically.
155 Empirical results
5.1 Data and baseline speciﬁcation
Equation (1) is estimated using monthly data and two lags of Rt. Rt is the annualized monthly
average of the federal funds rate and πt+hπ|t is the Greenbook forecast of the annualized percentage
change in the GNP or GDP deﬂator between t and t+hπ.19 Because of repeated changes in the base
year, no consistent time series of forecasted real GNP or GDP can be constructed from the Green-
book, over the sample considered. As a result, in the benchmark speciﬁcation, xt+hx|t is proxied
using the diﬀerence between the natural rate of unemployment and the forecasted unemployment
rate. Deﬁning the unemployment gap in this way makes its sign consistent with that of the output
gap, as conventionally deﬁned.
There is considerable uncertainty, not only about the appropriate measure but also, the relevant
concept of real activity.20 To maintain the real-time nature of the estimation, in the baseline
speciﬁcation, I use, as a measure of the natural rate of unemployment at time t, an historical average
of the unemployment rate up to that point. This is the same measure that Orphanides (2002)
presents and appears broadly consistent with narrative accounts of this period.21 I investigate below
the robustness of the baseline results to alternative real-time measures of real-activity, including
Orphanides’ (2003) real-time output gap measure.
The earliest Greenbook forecasts available are for the October 1965 FOMC meeting and are
made publicly available with a ﬁve year lag.22 The forecasts have been produced for various
19In October 1991, the Greenbook switched from forecasting the GNP deﬂator to the GDP deﬂator. In terms the
inﬂation measure, this change in deﬁnition has essentially no eﬀect on our results.
20Note that the time-varying constant accommodates, to some extent, mis-speciﬁcation in the real-activity measure.
21See for instance Orphanides (2003).
22Note that the current values of inﬂation and real activity are not known within the period. Besides, the Greenbook
forecasts are not available at a standard frequency: usually eight data points a year are available, and they are not
16horizons, in some instances ranging up to eight quarters ahead. But only the shorter horizons are
consistently available throughout the period. As a result, the forecasting horizons considered in
this paper vary from the current quarter up to three quarters ahead.23 The baseline speciﬁcation
assumes a three quarter (3-Q) ahead forecasting horizon on both inﬂation and the unemployment
gap, for which the available sample is 1969:5 to 1998:6. While this is broadly consistent with
the horizons considered in the literature, I also document below the robustness of the results to
alternative choices.
Figure 1 displays the time series of the various measures used in the baseline speciﬁcation.
5.2 Baseline results
As discussed in the Introduction, the existing literature suggests that the conclusion on whether
or not systematic monetary policy changed depends on various aspects of the empirical famework,
including the type of time variation in the parameters, the treatment of heteroskedasticity and
the real time nature of the data. To sort out the inﬂuence of each of these factors, in this sub-
section I ﬁrst test the stability and perform a split sample estimation of (1). Since a central
theme of this paper is that a proper model of the time variation is crucial to the conclusion, I
then consider a baseline TVP model that is otherwise identical the split-sample model. While this
basline speciﬁcation allows to identify the eﬀect of the TVP assumption, it is not necessarily meant
evenly spaced. In this paper I assume that in a given month, the Fed only observes the Greenbook forecasts for the
FOMC meeting that occurred before the beginning of that month. This presumably assumes slightly less information
than the Fed actually had. Sensible perturbations around this assumption, including linear interpolation between the
meetings, did not aﬀect the results.
23For the diﬀerent horizons, a consistent time series, with at least two observations per quarter, starts as follows:
Current quarter (C-Q): 1967:11. One quarter ahead (1-Q): 1968:7. Two quarters ahead (2-Q): 1968:9. Three quarters
ahead (3-Q): 1969:5.
17to represent the most satisfactory speciﬁcation. This is why in Section 5.3 I check the robustness
of the conclusions to alternative, perhaps more realistic, speciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst step is to provide statistical evidence that (1) indeed displays instability. Table 1
reports the p-values of the heteroskedasticity-robust version of the QLRT test, applied to diﬀerent
combinations of the parameters characterizing the long run policy responses.24 There is evidence
of instability for all these combinations. The test, applied jointly to all the coeﬃcients, suggest at
least two breaks: one in February 1974 and the other in May 1979. These results already suggest
that the time-variation might be more complex than the one-time discrete change that is often
assumed. The TVP estimates I report below will shed further light on the nature of these changes.






The joint stability test on all coeﬃcients result implies a median unbiased estimate of λ equal
to 7.63, which suggests a relatively small period to period variation in the parameters. As I alluded
to in the description of the estimation approach, this estimate is within the range of values of λ for
which the MLE tends to run into problems.25
24The p-values are obtained using Hansen (1997)’s simulation procedure.
25Stock and Watson (1998) show that for the local level model and for λ =8 , the probability of getting ˆ λ =0
with MLE is 42%. Comparatively, for the median-unbiased estimation approach, it is only 13% (See Table 1 of their
paper).
18Given the existing empirical results, it is useful to consider the estimates of the coeﬃcients,
assuming a one-time structural break. A natural break date, within the conﬁdence intervals of the
break dates just estimated, is October 1979. Romer and Romer (1989) argue that it corresponds
to a signiﬁcant shift in policy, soon after the start of Volcker’s tenure as chairman of the Fed.
The results from the policy rule estimated on each side of this date are reported in Table 2. The
estimates of β and ρi imply a long-run response to inﬂation,
β
1−ρ(1), equal to 1.37 and 1.57 in the
ﬁrst and second samples respectively. In terms of the response to inﬂation, these estimates would
suggest that monetary policy in the 1970’s was not too diﬀerent than under Volcker or Greenspan.
This is in line with the point made by Orphanides (2002, 2003).
Table 2: Split sample policy rule estimates with break in October 1979























(Standard errors in parenthesis)
Turning to the TVP results, the estimation is implemented as described in the previous section,
with the variance of the policy shock assumed to experience a structural break at the same date
as the parameters in the split sample estimation, i.e. October 1979. This is the same account of
heteroskedasticity implicit in the split-sample estimation. Figure 2 reports in the top panels the
estimates for the long-run response to inﬂation and unemployment, together with one standard
error conﬁdence bands,26 as well as the split-sample estimates reported in the previous table. The
26T h e s ea r eo b t a i n e df r o mt h eK a l m a nﬁlter, conditional on the median-unbiased estimate of the variance of the
19bottom panels report the estimates of the federal funds rate persistence, ρt(1), and the intercept,
αt, together with one standard error conﬁdence bands.
Contrary to the split-sample estimates, the TVP results suggest that the conduct of monetary
policy greatly evolved since the early 1970’s. The response to inﬂation varies roughly between 0.7
and 2.4 , that to unemployment between 0.4 and 2.6, and the persistence of the federal funds rate
between 0.85 and 0.93.27
The point estimates of the policy responses to inﬂation and unemployment reveal interesting
patterns. In the early 1970’s, the response to inﬂation was well above one. It fell substantially in
1973 — 1974, and by 1975 the response was below one, not satisfying the Taylor principle. The
response remained weak until the late 1970’s and then started to gradually increase until the mid-
1980’s. It eventually stabilized at a level above 2, with perhaps a mild decrease in the mid-1990’s.
Interestingly, the response to unemployment displays a quite diﬀerent pattern. It experienced a
sustained decrease throughout the 1970’s, evolving from a level above 2 to a level below 1 from
1978 onward. Concerning the persistence of the federal funds, two main observations stand out.
First, it was stable throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s at a level higher than in the 1970’s. Second,
there was a sharp reduction in the persistence of the federal funds rate in the early 1980’s; this is
in fact to be expected since this period was characterized by an atypical volatility of the federal
funds rate.
Overall, the characterization of monetary policy that emerges appears quite reasonable. In
fact, many aspects, including the timing of the changes, are consistent with existing accounts.28
parameters.
27An Okun’s law coeﬃcient, of 2.5 say, can be used to translate γt in terms of a response to the output gap. The
resulting coeﬃcient then varies roughly between 0.1 and 1.
28Concerning the timing of these changes, it is important to note that given that the estimated time series of the
parameters are based on a full-sample, two-sided ﬁlter, there is no reason to expect the TVP to pick up a change
20The behavior of policy during the early 1970’s matches Orphanides’ (2003) conjecture that the
Fed initially intended to respond aggressively to inﬂation, but failed to detect an adverse shift in
trend productivity. The weak response to inﬂation between 1975 and 1978 is consistent with the
account of Romer and Romer (1989), who argued, based on their readings of the FOMC minutes,
that “the actual commitment to combat inﬂation was weak” during that period. Like Clarida,
Galì and Gertler (2000) and Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005), the actual size of the response to
inﬂation during this period is estimated below one. In fact, the whole time series of the response to
inﬂation is surprinsingly similar to the one estimated by Cogley and Sargent (2005). The fact that
such similar conclusions are obtained from a markedly diﬀerent empirical framework and diﬀerent
treatment of real time issue is reassuring. Further, the inﬂation response reached a temporary peak
precisely in October 1979, a date singled out by Romer and Romer (1989) as corresponding to an
unusual tightening of monetary policy. Finally, the sustained decline in the response to real activity
corroborates the recent results of Orphanides (2003).
But the TVP estimates uncovers important features which have not been detected in previous
empirical analysis. The changes in both the response to inﬂation and real activity are sizeable and
important to characterize the evolution of monetary policy. Moreover, the uncovered behavior of
the parameters is more complex than any of the existing split-sample estimates suggest. First, the
changes in the response to inﬂation and unemployment do not appear to have been synchronized.
Second, as Romer and Romer (2002) argue, this evolution does not appear unidirectional and seems,
at least in part, gradual. We see, for instance, that while some important and sizeable changes
are apparent around the appointment of Volcker, the main increase in the response to inﬂation
occurred during the 1980 — 1982 period. Moreover the uncovered changes are not limited to that
with some delay.
21episode. This is consistent with evolving views and their gradual implementation within the Fed.29
Of course, precise statements about the size of the policy response need to be qualiﬁed by the
statistical uncertainty surrounding these estimates. For instance, we cannot conclude at conven-
tional statistical level that the response to inﬂation is really below one between 1975 and 1978.30
It is important to stress, however, that the changes in the coeﬃcients over time are statistically
signiﬁcant, as implied by the stability test reported above.31 That is, the response to inﬂation is
signiﬁcantly smaller between 1975-1978 than anywhere else in the sample.
In light of the TVP results, it is also instructive to look more closely at the robustness of the
split-sample results. At ﬁrst sight, the split-sample and TVP estimates appear to yield dramatically
diﬀerent conclusions concerning the evolution of monetary policy, particularly about the strength
of the response to inﬂation. However, given the nature of the changes uncovered by the TVP
estimation, this is not surprising. The long-run response to inﬂation varies considerably throughout
the 1970’s, being high initially and low in the mid- to late 1970’s. Other things equal, the constant
parameter OLS estimate for the pre-1979:9 sample should thus tend to be downward biased in the
earlier part of that period and upward biased in the later part. The results reported above are
certainly consistent with this explanation: the OLS estimates is 1.37, which corresponds to the
mid-range of the TVP estimates obtained for that period. To investigate this further, I re-estimate
29It is true, as it should be clear from the description provided in the previous Section, that the TVP estimation
should tend to make discrete changes look more gradual than they really are. But that is not suﬃcient to explain the
gradual nature of the uncovered changes. In fact, the TVP estimates has no problem picking up a rapid increase in
the response to inﬂation in late 1979 and the changes are not limited to that period, as the behavior of the response
to unemployment makes clear. I investigate this further below by considering a speciﬁcation that nests a TVP with
a discrete change in 1979:10.
30The marginal probability that the reponse to inﬂation is below one at the trough is about 80%.
31Note that the signiﬁcance of the changes in the coeﬃcients cannot be formally inferred from the conﬁdence
intervals.
22the constant parameter model over the 1974:2 — 1979:9 period, where the starting date corresponds
to the ﬁrst break date estimate reported above. The results are reported in Table 3. Note that if
the true nature of the change in policy was a discrete jump in 1979:10, starting the ﬁrst sample
later or ending it earlier, should not dramatically aﬀect the results. Yet, they appear extremely
fragile: the long-run response to inﬂation in this case drops from 1.37 to 0.83, consistent with the
TVP estimates results. Moreover, ending this sample just one month earlier, in 1979:8, makes
the estimate drop further to 0.43. This evidence suggests that the way instability is modeled is
crucial to uncover properly the nature of the changes in monetary policy during the 1970’s. This
provides further evidence of the gradual nature of the actual changes and also of the fragility of
the split-sample estimates in the present context.
Table 3: Policy rule estimates for alternative sub-samples























(Standard errors in parenthesis)
Given the behavior of the TVP estimates around 1979 and the widely held belief of a drastic
change in policy soon after Volcker’s appointment, it might still be argued that a discrete shift
would be more appropriate to describe this period. One way to check more directly if this potential
mis-speciﬁcation of the TVP model is important, is to nest together the TVP and discrete change
model. In order to maintain a parsimonious speciﬁcation, βt and γt are assumed to follow driftless
23random walks, with a potential discrete shift in 1979:10.32 Letting Dt be a dummy equal to one
for t greater than 1979:10, the estimated policy reaction function is:
Rt = αt + βtπt+hπ|t + ˜ βDtπt+hπ|t + γtxt+hx|t +˜ γDtxt+hx|t + ρt(L)Rt−1 + εt.
This can be estimated as before, accounting for the presence of the time invariant parameters, ˜ β
and ˜ γ. The time series of the response to inﬂation is given by βt + ˜ βDt, and to the unemployment
gap by γt +˜ γDt.
Figure 3 compares the resulting estimates together with the previous TVP results. There are
af e wd i ﬀerences in the results when a discrete shift is allowed. First, the estimated persistence
of the federal funds rate is everywhere lower. Second the time variation in the response to unem-
ployment might be partly discrete in nature and is estimated to be lower post-1980.33 Third, the
response to inﬂation is slightly higher in the mid-1970’s, implying a lower probability that the Tay-
lor principle has been violated. Importantly, however, the conclusions about the general evolution
of the responses to inﬂation and unemployment remain intact: the changes are important, largely
gradual and the timing is essentially the same. Perhaps surprisingly, the response to inﬂation does
not show any important jump in 1979, even though such a discrete change is explicitly allowed.
The conclusions drawn on the basis of the TVP estimates thus appear robust to the presence of a
discrete change in 1979, if such a change indeed occurred.
32Note that I am not arguing that the nested model is a more appropriate one. In fact, a key advantage of the
TVP estimation is that it does not rely on a choice of a simultaneous break date for all parameters. This is not the
case for the nested model.
33Note, however, that there is no guarantee that 1979:10 is the true date for the response to unemployment.
245.3 Robustness
I now investigate the robustness of the previous results along three dimensions: the date at which
t h ev a r i a n c eo fεt changed, the choice of the forecasting horizons and alternative measures of real
activity.
5.3.1 Heteroskedasticity
So far, the TVP estimation assumed a single change in the variance of the policy shock in 1979:10.
This has the virtue of making the TVP results directly comparable with the split-sample results,
which implicitly rely on the same assumption. It is not clear, however, that a single break in the
variance fully captures the heteroskedasticity of the policy shock. One way to gain further insights
is to look at the time series behavior of the full sample OLS residuals of (1). These are displayed in
Figure 4. Clearly, the early 1980’s period stands out. The volatility of the policy shock was a lot
larger, which might be due in part to the Fed following a diﬀerent operating procedure during that
period.34 This could have been wrongly attributed to time variation in the parameters. Outside
this period, however, there is no clear pattern.
One way to capture this behavior of the policy shock, and non-parametrically account for the
potential change in operating procedure, is to allow for three regimes in the variance of the policy
shock, with the middle one corresponding to the early 1980’s.35 Based on Figure 4, this should
be enough to capture the extent of heteroskedasticity present in these shocks. Figure 5 shows the
resulting TVP estimates, deﬁning the 1979:10 to 1982:10 as the second of the three regimes. The
34The federal funds rate provides probably a less adequate measure of monetary policy stance between 1979:10 and
1982:10, as non-borrowed reserves were set to achieve a level of interest rates consistent with money growth target.
But Cook (1989) argues that the fed funds rate may still provide a satisfactory indicator during this period.
35Boivin (1999) allows explicitly for changes in the operating procedure using the Bernanke and Mihov (1998)
model. This requires a multi-variate framework which is beyond the scope of this paper.
25second regimes corresponds to the non-borrowed reserves targeting episode. The key diﬀerence
with the previous TVP estimates is that the variation in the parameters post-1982 is much more
pronounced. This is not surprising, however: since the variance of the policy shock post-1984 is
about ten times smaller than previously estimated,36 more of the ﬂuctuation in the federal funds
rate is attributed to variations in the parameters. In fact, much of this variation seems to be due
to the federal funds rate persistence, which induces similar movements in the long-run response to
inﬂation and unemployment gap. Overall, however, the conclusions about the nature of the changes
in monetary policy are unaﬀected.
5.3.2 Forecasting horizons
There is also some uncertainty about the forecasting horizons that properly characterize the Fed’s
behavior. Figure 6 reports the TVP estimates, assuming three regimes in the variance of the policy
shock, for various horizon combinations: hπ = hx =0 , hπ = hx =1 , hπ = hx =2 , hπ = hx =3
and hπ =3 ,h x =0 .37 In all cases, there is important time variation in the parameters. The
pattern of responses to real activity are similar over the whole period and the to inﬂation in the
1970’s are similar. For short horizons, hπ = hx =0and hπ = hx =1 ,t h er e s p o n s et oi n ﬂation is
smaller throughout the sample, but especially in the post-1980 period. This smaller response to
current inﬂation is consistent with the Fed being forward-looking: loosely speaking, the estimated
coeﬃcient on current inﬂation should be equal to the actual response to inﬂation at horizon hπ,
multiplied by a coeﬃcient, less than one, related to the degree of persistence in inﬂation between t
and t + hπ. But, apart perhaps for the very short horizons, the conclusions about the importance
36In the baseline estimation, the post-1979:10 variance of the policy shock was 0.502, whereas now it is 2.271 for
the 1979:10-1982:10 period and 0.060 for the post-1982:10 period. The variance of the shock in the pre-1979:10 period
is 0.154.
37Clarida, Gali and Gertler use hπ = hy =1as their baseline speciﬁcation.
26and the pattern of the changes remain essentially the same.
5.3.3 Real activity measures
Finally, perhaps the most important source of uncertainty about this speciﬁcation concerns the
appropriate real-time measure of real activity. In fact, one important conclusion from Orphanides
(2003) is that to properly characterize the historical conduct of monetary policy, a proper account
of the historically perceived real activity level is essential. While the recursive average of the
unemployment rate considered so far is arguably a reasonable measure, consistent with existing
empirical applications, there is no guarantee that this, or any other measure, corresponds to the
natural rate historically perceived by policymakers. It is thus important to make sure that the
results are at least robust to other sensible alternatives.
I ﬁrst consider alternative measures of the natural rate of unemployment displaying varying
degree of smoothness. Figure 7 displays the baseline measure together with three alternatives: 1)
a ﬁve year moving average as in Bernanke and Boivin (2003), 2) a three year moving average and










t denote the natural rate of unemployment. This last measure, which can be interpreted as
a constant gain update of the mean of unemployment, might be more appropriate than the moving
average measure to track the natural rate of unemployment if it is itself moving over time.38 As is
apparent from the Figure, they do considerably diﬀer and thus constitute a useful robustness check.
Figure 8 compares the resulting TVP estimates together with the baseline results. Even though
the underlying measures of the natural rate diﬀer substantially, the implied time variation is overall
38Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this measure.
27very similar. In particular, the time path of the long-run response to inﬂation is essentially the
same, no matter the measure used. There might be somewhat more uncertainty about the exact
nature of the change in the long-run response to unemployment: with the exponentional smoother,
it increases more rapidly and to a higher level from the mid-1980’s onward. But for all measures,
the results suggest that the changes in the conduct of monetary policy were sizeable.
All the real-activity measures so far considered are based on the unemployment rate. As men-
tioned above, an advantage is that they are constructed from a time series that essentially has a
consistent deﬁnition throughout the period. This is not the case for measures based on real GNP
or GDP. As a robustness check, however, it is interesting to see if a real-time measure based on the
output gap yields similar results. I thus re-estimate the version of (1) considered by Orphanides
(2003). It is based on quarterly data, the three-quarter ahead Greenbook inﬂation forecast, one
lag of the federal funds rate and the real-time output gap measure he constructed.39 In a given
quarter, this alternative output gap measure is based on the headline concept of real output that
was in use during that quarter. Orphanides (2003) argues that this measure is as close as is possible
to the policymakers’ perceptions reported in the available historical record. The results from this
speciﬁcation are displayed in Figure 9. Using quarterly data and this output gap measure yields
surprisingly similar results. In fact, applying a simple Okun law calculation to the estimated re-
sponse to the output gap yields estimates of the same magnitude as those previously obtained for
the unemployment gap.
The characterization of the evolution of monetary policy that stems from the benchmark speci-
ﬁcation is thus robust to alternative measures of the natural rate of unemployment and Orphanides’
(2003) account of policymakers’ perceptions.
39In this case the sample ends in 1995:4.
286C o n c l u s i o n
Determining whether or not the conduct of monetary policy changed is central to our understanding
of the eﬀect of monetary policy and of the root causes of the improved U.S. economic performance
of the last twenty years. Although there has been a considerable amount of research on the topic,
there are still important disagreements, even about the mere existence of these changes.
Accounting for the various issues at the center of this disagreement, the empirical investigation
in this paper led to the following conclusions:
• The conduct of monetary policy changed greatly over the last 30 years. The response to
inﬂation was very weak in the second half of the 1970’s, but strong elsewhere in the sample.
The response to real activity fell substantially and lastingly throughout the 1970’s. From the
mid-1980’s onward, the conduct of monetary policy appears to have been stable.
• The rich pattern of changes in the response to inﬂation and unemployment are not well
captured by a discrete shift, occurring in 1979. The changes are not unidirectional nor
synchronized across parameters. Moreover the transition under Volcker appears to have
taken place over a few years, with the most important changes occurring between 1980 and
1982. More than real-time data issues, the complex nature of the changes might explain why
conﬂicting results have been reported in the literature.
The timing of these changes is certainly consistent with monetary factors playing a role in the
improved economic outcomes of the last two decades. This conﬁrms the view stemming from the
narrative evidence cited in the Introduction. Of course, the next step, which requires a fully speciﬁed
model of the economy, is to measure this evidence against other non-monetary sources of improved
economic performance, such as the private sector behavior or simply luck. But, beyond the timing,
29the magnitude of the changes identiﬁed in this paper is substantial, suggesting a non-trivial role of
monetary policy.
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Figure 1: Real-time data used in the estimation




















Long-run response to unemployment gap


















Figure 2: TVP estimates: Benchmark speciﬁcation
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Figure 3: TVP estimates with discrete shifts in β and γ





Figure 4: Estimated policy shocks: Full sample, constant parameters
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Long-run response to unemployment gap

















Figure 5: TVP estimates: Alternative treatment of heteroskedasticity (Breaks in the variance in
1979:10 and 1982:10)






















Long-run response to unemployment gap


















Figure 6: TVP estimates: Alternative forecasting horizons [inﬂation, gap]









Figure 7: Alternative moving-average measures of the natural rate of unemployment




















Long-run response to unemployment gap


















Figure 8: TVP estimates: Alternative measures of the natural rate of unemployment



















Long-run response to output gap
















Figure 9: TVP estimates: Quarterly data and real-time output gap measure (Orphanides (2003))
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